Foreign Aid and Economic Growth: The Role of Flexible Labor Supply by Santanu Chatterjee & Stephen Turnovsky
 
Foreign Aid and Economic Growth:  





Department of Economics 
University of Georgia 
 
Stephen J. Turnovsky 
Department of Economics 







This paper examines the link between foreign aid, economic growth, and welfare in a 
small open economy.  External transfers impinge on the recipient’s macroeconomic 
performance by affecting resource allocation decisions and relative prices.  The 
endogeneity of the labor-leisure choice and the adjustment of the real wage rate play a 
crucial role in the propagation of foreign aid shocks. Another crucial determinant of the 
efficacy of foreign aid is externalities associated with the public good that the aid helps 
finance. The impact of tied and untied aid on the recipient government’s intertemporal 
fiscal balance is also considered. Finally, the transitional adjustment to a foreign aid 
shock is shown to depend crucially on the elasticity of substitution in production and the 
relative importance of the labor-leisure choice in utility.     
 
Revised version 
November 2005  
 
JEL Classifications: E6, F4, O1 




*This paper has benefited from presentations at the 2004 MEA meetings in Chicago, the 2004 Annual 
Conference of the Royal Economic Society in Swansea, the 10
th International Conference of the Society of 
Computational Economics in Amsterdam, the 59
th European Meeting of the Econometric Society in 
Madrid, the 2004 NEUDC conference in Montreal, and the 2005 Fall Meeting of the Midwest International 
Economics Group at the University of Kansas.  The constructive suggestions of an anonymous referee and 
the Co-Editor, Gordon Hanson, are gratefully acknowledged.  Chatterjee acknowledges financial support 
from the Terry-Sanford Research Grant at the University of Georgia, while Turnovsky’s research was 
supported in part by the Castor endowment at the University of Washington. 1 
1. Introduction 
  Official development assistance, in the form of foreign aid or unilateral capital transfers, 
represents an important channel through which wealth is transferred from rich, developed nations to 
poorer, underdeveloped economies.  Both the magnitude and the scope of these international 
transfers have increased significantly over the last four decades.  For example, total flows of official 
development assistance from members of the OECD and OPEC countries have increased from about 
$6 million in 1965 to over $59 billion in 2002.  By that time these funds had come to represent 
between 3-5 percent of the Gross National Income of the recipient low and middle income countries, 
and to finance between 10-20 percent of their gross capital formation.
1   
  One issue of concern for both donors and recipients is how foreign aid should be spent in an 
economy with scarce resources.  This has given rise to a long-standing debate, both in academic and 
policy circles, as to whether international transfers should be “tied” (“productive”) or “untied” 
(“pure”).  As Bhagwati (1967) points out, tied external assistance can take several forms.  It may be 
linked to: (i) a specific investment project, (ii) a specific commodity or service, or (iii) procurement 
in a specific country.  Recent studies by the World Bank point out that over time, a larger proportion 
of foreign aid has become “untied” with respect to requirements for procuring goods and services 
from the donor country, but it has become more “tied” in the sense of being linked to investments in 
public infrastructure projects (telecommunications, energy, transport, water services, etc).  Between 
1994 and 1999, for example, the proportion of official development assistance that was “untied” in 
the sense of not being subject to restrictions by donors on procurement sources rose from 66 percent 
to about 84 percent.  At the same time, between two-thirds and three-fourths of official development 
assistance was either fully or partially tied to public infrastructure projects (see footnote 1).   
The move toward tying more aid to public investment has been dictated mainly by the 
growing infrastructure requirements of developing countries.  Most economists agree that investment 
in public infrastructure raises the productivity and efficiency of the private sector and, as a 
consequence, provides a crucial channel for economic growth, development, and higher living 
                                                 
1 World Bank (1994, 2004). 2 
standards.
2  But financing public investment has proven to be a challenging task for developing 
economies.  Most such countries have significantly restricted public borrowing after the debt-crisis 
of the early 1980s, while at the same time their infrastructure requirements have increased steadily.  
A 1994 World Bank study has estimated these requirements to be $200 billion a year.  Facing 
binding fiscal constraints, governments in developing countries have turned to external financing, in 
the form of tied foreign aid programs, as a significant source of financing public investment. 
The question of what form foreign aid should take has led to a growing empirical literature 
on the link between foreign aid and economic growth; see Burnside and Dollar (2000), Hansen and 
Tarp (2000), and Easterly (2003).  Recently, Chatterjee, Sakoulis, and Turnovsky (2003) and 
Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2004) have developed a general equilibrium-growth framework within 
which this issue can be analyzed.  Their results indicate that the consequences of tied and untied aid 
programs on economic growth and welfare depend crucially upon a number of key structural 
characteristics of the recipient economy.  These include: (i) the costs associated with installing the 
publicly provided capital (intertemporal adjustment costs), (ii) the substitutability between public 
and private capital in production (intratemporal adjustment costs), (iii) the degree of access to the 
world financial market (financial adjustment costs), and (iv) the opportunities for co-financing 
infrastructure projects by domestic resources, like the domestic government or private sector. 
This paper distinguishes itself from the existing theoretical literature on aid and growth by 
focusing on three critical aspects absent from previous analysis.  First, and most important among 
these, is the relaxation of the restrictive assumption that labor supply in the recipient economy is 
inelastic.  We show how the endogeneity of labor supply is a crucial transmission mechanism for 
foreign aid.  Specifically, a given aid flow alters the marginal valuations of work and leisure, thereby 
impacting on the economy’s productive capacity and resulting macroeconomic performance.   
Second, we focus on the interaction between labor and public capital in determining the productivity 
of private capital in production.  A natural specification, consistent with sustaining an equilibrium of 
ongoing (endogenous) growth, is for labor to interact with public capital to yield “labor efficiency 
                                                 
2 Theoretical and empirical interest in the impact of public capital on macroeconomic performance originated with the 
work of Arrow and Kurz (1970) and more recently with Aschauer (1989a, 1989b); see Gramlich (1994) for a survey of 
the early empirical literature.  Theoretical contributions include Futagami, Morita, and Shibata (1993), Baxter and King 
(1993), Fisher and Turnovsky (1998), Devarajan, Xie, and Zou (1998), Turnovsky (2004). 3 
units”, which then interact with private capital to produce final output in accordance with a 
production, which can conveniently be assumed to be of the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
form.  Treating this specification as a benchmark, we further extend the model by introducing an 
additional general productivity enhancing role for public capital, whereby it mitigates congestion 
associated with aggregate capital.   Our results show how the relative merits of tied and untied aid 
are quite sensitive to how these externalities impinge on production, as well as their magnitudes.  
Finally, motivated by Burnside and Dollar (2000), we show how our theoretical model enables us to 
assess the effects of tied and untied aid programs on the recipient government’s fiscal deficit, which 
is an element of the “good” policy index in the Burnside-Dollar paper.  The numerical simulations 
we conduct highlight the tradeoffs that exist between the impact of foreign aid on consumer welfare, 
on the one hand, and on the recipient government’s financial position, on the other. 
Given the complexity of the model, most of the analysis is conducted numerically.  The 
ability of the representative agent to choose between work and leisure dramatically alters many of 
the results obtained by Chatterjee et al. (2003) and Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2004).  Specifically, 
these earlier papers show that when labor supply is inelastic, even though a tied aid shock generates 
a dynamic adjustment, an untied aid shock has no dynamic consequences for the recipient economy, 
and leads only to instantaneous increases in consumption and welfare.  In contrast, we show that 
with flexible labor supply, both types of aid generate dynamic responses, albeit dramatically 
different in nature.  In the case of untied aid, the dynamic adjustment occurs primarily through the 
labor-leisure choice, and the effect this has on the marginal rate of substitution between consumption 
and leisure and on the real wage rate.  Although the economy’s current account and welfare improve 
in the long run, the reduced work effort and higher consumption leads to a decline in the equilibrium 
growth rate.  In contrast, an aid program that is tied to investment in public capital generates a much 
more gradual dynamic adjustment, one that is precisely opposite in nature to that following an untied 
aid program.  There are significant tradeoffs in welfare between the short run and the long run, as the 
agent increases his work effort and initially substitutes away from consumption toward investment.  
The benefits of this substitution are realized only gradually over time, as the investment in public 
capital enhances productivity in the recipient economy and thereby increases both growth and 4 
welfare.  We further illustrate how the characteristics of the transitional dynamics and the long-run 
effects of tied and untied aid programs depend crucially upon the recipient’s elasticity of substitution 
in production and the elasticity of leisure in utility. 
All three aspects being emphasized – the endogeneity of labor supply, the extent of public 
good-production externalities, and the recipient economy’s level of public spending – play crucial 
roles in determining the contrasting effects of tied versus untied aid programs.  On the one hand, 
both the short-run and the long-run welfare gains from an untied aid shock are remarkably uniform 
and relatively insensitive to these characteristics, as well as to the elasticity of substitution in 
production.  On the other hand, there is a sharp difference between the short-run and long-run 
welfare effects of tied aid, both of which are highly sensitive to these same characteristics.     
These contrasting sensitivities of the welfare gains resulting from a tied and untied transfer, 
respectively, means that their relative merits, from a welfare standpoint, are also highly sensitive to 
these critical elements.  For the benchmark case of a Cobb-Douglas production function, and for 
what we view as a plausible elasticity of leisure in utility, tied aid is marginally superior to untied aid 
from a long-run (intertemporal) welfare perspective.  However, as this elasticity declines, untied aid 
becomes superior to tied aid, while as the elasticity increases, the superiority of tied aid is enhanced.  
But this comparison is very sensitive to even small variations in the elasticity of substitution, those 
that might lie within a statistical margin of error.   
The economy’s fiscal structure has interesting consequences for the choice between tied and 
untied aid.  While untied aid always improves the government’s intertemporal fiscal balance, tied aid 
always leads to a deterioration, thus suggesting a potential tradeoff between consumer welfare and 
government solvency in the latter case.  The sensitivity of the welfare effects of tied transfers to the 
rate of domestic government investment in the recipient economy has further important policy 
implications.  If this component of expenditure is extremely small, then tied aid is not only superior 
to untied aid, it is in fact optimal, while the reverse applies if it is large.  In contrast, for intermediate 
rates of government investment, the optimal composition of a given flow of foreign aid requires that 
it be partially tied to public investment. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 sets out the analytical 5 
framework and summarizes the macro-dynamic equilibrium.  Since the basic framework builds on 
our previous work, our description can be brief.  But we hasten to add that the introduction of labor 
is nontrivial, involving substantial technical details that are relegated to the Appendix.  Section 3 
conducts numerical simulations and considers the consequences of the elastic labor supply in 
assessing the relative merits of tied versus untied aid.  Section 4 provides some sensitivity analysis, 
while Section 5 considers the consequences for fiscal balance.  Section 6 concludes with some 
caveats and policy advice. 
2.  The Analytical Framework 
  We begin by spelling out the building blocks of the model.   
2.1. Private  Sector 
We consider a small open economy populated by an infinitely-lived representative agent who 
produces and consumes a single traded commodity.  The agent has a unit of time, a fraction l of 
which can be devoted to leisure, and the balance, 1 l − , to labor supply.  Output, Y, is produced using 
the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function 
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where K denotes the representative agent's stock of private capital, K  is the average stock of private 
capital, and KG denotes the stock of public capital.  The production function comprises two 
components.  In the first, public capital interacts with the agent’s labor supply to yield labor 
measured in efficiency units, (1− l)KG which in turn combines with private capital.
3  The second is 
the externality provided by public capital, incorporated in the term, () G KK
ε .  Here,  G K  enhances 
general productivity by offsetting congestion effects associated with the aggregate private capital 
stock,  K ; see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Eicher and Turnovsky (2000).  The production 
function has constant returns to scale in both the private factors of production, K and(1 ) l − , and the 
accumulating factors,  , , and  G KK K, enabling it to support an equilibrium of ongoing (endogenous) 
                                                 
3 Thus  1( 1 ) s ρ ≡+  is the elasticity of substitution between private capital and “efficiency units of labor” in production.   6 
growth with both private factors being paid their respective marginal physical products.
 4 
  The agent consumes this good at the rate C, yielding utility over an infinite horizon 
represented by the isoelastic utility function: 
     ()
0
1 t UC l e d t
γ θβ
γ
∞ − ≡∫      ( 1 b )  
where θ  represents the relative importance of leisure in utility.  The agent also accumulates physical 
capital, with expenditure on a given change in the capital stock, I, involving adjustment (installation) 
costs specified by the quadratic (convex) function 
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Letting δK denote the rate of depreciation, the net rate of private capital accumulation is thus  
     K I K K δ − =          ( 1 d )  
Agents have access to a world capital market, allowing them to borrow internationally.  We 
assume that the creditworthiness of the economy influences its cost of borrowing from abroad.  The 
world capital market assesses the economy's ability to service its debt costs, and views the country's 
debt-capital (equity) ratio as an indicator of its default risk.  Accordingly, the interest rate a country 
is charged on the world capital market increases with this ratio.  This leads to an upward sloping 
supply schedule for debt, which we express by assuming that the borrowing rate,  () K N r , charged 
on (national) foreign debt, N, relative to the stock of private capital, K, is of the form:
  
    () ( ) 0 >     ;
* ω ω ′ + = K N r K N r       ( 1 e )  
where  r
* is the exogenously given world interest rate, and  ( ) K N ω  is the country-specific 
borrowing premium that increases with the nation's debt-capital ratio.
 5  The homogeneity of the 
                                                 
4 Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2004) assume  0 ε =  and we shall treat this as our benchmark case as well.  We have also 
briefly considered the alternative specification:  ( )
1 () [ { ( 1 ) } 1 ] G YK K l K K
ε ρρ ρ αη η
−− − =− + − , which simply augments 
the Romer (1986) model to include the “congestion-offsetting” externality effect of public capial; see footnote 18. 
5The original formulation of this type of borrowing cost relationship is due to Bardhan (1967).  Further discussion and 
rationalization of it, including variants of the specification and some empirical support, are discussed in our earlier work. 7 
relationship is required to sustain a balanced growth equilibrium.
  
The representative agent chooses consumption, labor supply, and the rates of capital and debt 
accumulation, to maximize intertemporal utility, (1b), subject to the flow budget constraint 
                             () ( ) ,( 1 ) NCr N K N I K YT τ =+ + Ψ −− +                             (2) 
where N is the stock of debt held by the private sector, τ is the income tax rate, and T  denotes lump-
sum taxes.
6  In performing this optimization, the agent takes the borrowing rate, r(.) as given.  This 
is because the interest rate facing the debtor nation, as reflected in (1e), is a function of the 
economy's aggregate debt-capital ratio, which the individual agent knows he cannot influence.   
The optimality conditions with respect to the individual’s choices of C, l, and I are  
     λ
θγ γ =
− l C
1         ( 3 a )  
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     () 1 1 hI K q +=        ( 3 c )  
where λ  is the shadow value of wealth in the form of internationally traded bonds, q′ is the shadow 
value of the agent’s private capital stock, and qq µ ′ =  is thus the market price of private capital in 
terms of the traded bonds.  Equation (3a) equates the marginal utility of consumption to the shadow 
value of wealth, while (3b) equates the marginal utility of leisure to the shadow value of after-tax 
income foregone, where the marginal product of labor,  ( ) 1 Yl ∂ ∂−, equals the equilibrium wage 
rate.  The third equation equates the marginal cost of an additional unit of investment, inclusive of 
the marginal installation cost,  1 hI K to the market value of capital.  Equation (3c) may be 
immediately solved to yield the following expression for the growth rate of private capital 











      (3c’) 
  Applying the standard optimality conditions with respect to N and K leads to the usual 
                                                 
6 Since we are focusing on debtor nations, we assume N > 0.  However, it is possible for N < 0 in which case the agent 
accumulates credit by lending abroad.  For simplicity, interest income is assumed to be untaxed. 8 
arbitrage relationships, equating the rates of return on consumption and investment in private capital 
to the costs of borrowing from abroad 
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Finally, in order to ensure that the agent’s intertemporal budget constraint is met, the following 






→∞ =  lim
t→∞ ′  q Ke
−βt = 0.                                               (4c) 
2.2  Public Capital, Foreign Aid, and National Debt 
The resources for the accumulation of public capital come from two sources: domestically 
financed government expenditure on public capital, G , and a program of capital transfers or foreign 
aid, TR, from the rest of the world.  We therefore postulate  
GG T R φ ≡+      01 φ ≤ ≤    (5) 
where φ  represents the degree to which the foreign aid is tied to investment in public infrastructure.  
If φ = 1, the aid is completely tied to public investment and is therefore “productive”; if φ = 0, aid is 
completely unrestricted and thus represent a “pure” transfer, of the traditional Keynes-Ohlin type.   
Analogous to private capital, we assume that the gross accumulation of public capital, G, is 
also subject to convex costs of adjustment:
7 
( )( ) ( ) 2 (, ) 1 2 GG GK G h GK Γ= + .   
Public capital stock depreciates at the rate,  G δ , so that its net rate of accumulation is 
                                                 
7Note that there are different ways of specifying how aid is tied.  The specification (5) relates aid to the accumulation of 
new public capital.  An alternative formulation is to tie the aid to total investment costs, inclusive of installation costs.  
As noted by Chatterjee et al. (2003), the differences between these specifications are minor, and since there is no 
compelling evidence favoring one formulation over the other, we adopt (5), which turns out to be marginally simpler.  9 
                               GG G KG K δ =−  .                                                         (6) 
To sustain an equilibrium of on-going growth, both domestic government expenditure on 
infrastructure,  G , and the flow of aid from abroad, TR, must be tied to the scale of the recipient 
economy.  We do this by specifying them as a fraction of that country’s level of income 
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The government sets its tax and expenditure parameters to maintain a balanced budget:
8  
Expressing this in the form 
(, ) G TG KY T R τ =Γ − −                                             (7) 
T determines the lump-sum tax necessary to balance the current budget, given by the right hand side 
of (7).  The national budget constraint, (the current account) is obtained by combining (7) and (2), 
() ( ) ( ) ,, G Nr N K NC I K G K YT R =+ + Ψ + Γ − −  .     (8) 
That is, the economy accumulates debt to finance its total expenditures on public capital, private 
capital, consumption, and interest payments net of output produced and transfers received.  
2.3 Macroeconomic  Equilibrium 
  The steady-state equilibrium of the economy has the characteristic that all real aggregate 
quantities grow at the same constant rate, and that the labor allocation, l, and the relative price of 
capital, q, are constant.  We show in the Appendix how the equilibrium dynamics of the system can 
be conveniently expressed in terms of the following stationary variables, z≡ KG K,  n ≡ N K , l and 
                                                 
8 Several aid programs call for co-financing by the government of the recipient economy, whereby it is required to match 
the foreign aid to some degree.  This has been addressed in some detail in our previous work, where we also consider 
growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing government responses.  Since the main consequences of co-financing 
arrangements are only marginally affected by the elasticity of labor supply, we do not consider this aspect further here. 10 
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and the growth rates of the two types of capital are  
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Equations (9a) – (9d) provide an autonomous set of dynamic equations in  , ,  , and  zn l q  of which, 
two ( , ) kn are state variables, while the remaining two ( , ) ql are “jump” variables, free to respond 
instantaneously to new information as it becomes available.  Once z and l are known, the output-11 
capital ratio and the consumption-output ratio are determined by (10b) and (10c).   
The economy reaches steady state when  0 znlq = ===    .  Applying these conditions to (9a) 
– (9d) we can solve for the steady-state values  ,  ,  , and  zqn l    .  Given these quantities, (10b) – (10d) 
and either (11a) or (11b) determine  , yc  , the steady-state interest rate r , and the long-run growth 
rate ψ  , respectively.
9  Linearizing (9a) – (9d) around the steady-state yields an approximation to the 
underlying dynamic system.  This system (not reported) forms the basis for our dynamic simulations.  
To be saddlepoint-stable, we require that there be two unstable roots to match the two jump 
variables.  For all plausible sets of parameter values our numerical simulations yield the required 
pattern of eigenvalues, namely two positive (unstable) and two negative (stable) roots, the latter 
being denoted by µ1 and µ2, withµ2 < µ1 < 0. 
  Equations (9) and (10) represent “core” dynamic equations from which other key variables, 
in particular the various growth rates, may be derived.  In addition to the growth rates of the two 
capital goods reported in (11a) and (11b), the growth rates of consumption and output are given by  
   () ( )[ ] 1/ ( , , , ) ( , )
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where (.), (.) FG  are defined in the Appendix.  Although the growth rates diverge during the 
transition, they ultimately converge to the common equilibrium rate  K G ψ ψ =  CY ψ ψψ ===  . 
3.  The Dynamic Effects of Foreign Aid: A Numerical Analysis 
  Due to the complexity of the model, we will examine the dynamic effects of a foreign aid or 
a transfer shock using numerical simulations.  We begin by calibrating a benchmark economy, using 
the following parameters representative of a small open economy, which starts out from an 
equilibrium without any transfers or aid from abroad. 
                                                 
9 The solution for the steady-state equilibrium is set out in the Appendix.  Because this system is highly non-linear, it 
need not be consistent with a well-defined steady-state equilibrium with  0, 0 zc >>   .  Our numerical simulations, 
however, yield well-defined steady-state values for all plausible specifications of all the structural and policy parameters. 
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The Benchmark Economy 
 
Preference parameters:        γ = -1.5, β = 0.04,  1 θ =  
Production parameters:       α = 0.6, η = 0.2,  0 ε = , h1 =15, h2  = 15 
Elasticity of substitution 
in production:                       1 s =  
Depreciation rates:              δK = 0.05, δG = 0.05 
World interest rate:             
* r = 0.06,  
Premium on borrowing:      a = 0.15
10 
Policy parameters:              τ = 0.15, g = 0.05 
Transfers:                           σ  = 0, φ = 0 
Our choices of preference parameters β,γ , and depreciation rates, δK,δG, the world interest 
rate, 
* r  are standard, while α is a scale variable.  The productive elasticity of public capital η = 0.2 
is consistent with the empirical evidence (see Gramlich, 1994).  But given the introduction of labor 
in efficiency units, this implies that the productive elasticity of labor is also 0.2, while that of private 
capital is 0.8.
11  Setting  1 s =  yields the Cobb-Douglas technology, which serves as a reasonable 
benchmark.  The borrowing premium  0.15 a =  is chosen to ensure a plausible equilibrium debt-
output ratio.  The elasticity on leisure, θ , is the crucial determinant of the equilibrium labor-leisure 
allocation and has been set to ensure that this is empirically plausible.  The tax rate is set at τ = 0.15, 
while the rate of domestic government expenditure on public investment is assumed to be  0.05 g = .  
The choice of adjustment costs is less obvious and h1 = 15 lies in the consensus range of 10 to 16.
12  
Note also that the equality of adjustment costs between the two types of capital serves as a plausible 
benchmark.  The public good externality parameter is set at  0 ε = . 
Substituting these base parameters into the steady state equations (A.7a) – (A.7f)m (11a) and 
the functional form for (10d), yields the following benchmark equilibrium values: 
0.253, 0.141, 1.997, 0.780,  znql ====    0.337, 0.202, yc = =   0.0813, r =   and  0.0165 ψ =  .  
                                                 
10 The functional specification of the upward sloping supply curve that we use is:
* () 1
an rn r e = +− .  Thus, in the case of 
a perfect world capital market, when a = 0, 
* rr = , the world interest rate. 
11 An inevitable feature of calibrating a Romer (1986) - type AK model is that keeping the size of the externality 
plausible, while maintaining the assumption of constant returns to scale in the private factors, imposes constraints on the 
elasticities on labor and private capital.  In order to reconcile these elasticities with the empirical evidence on the income 
shares of labor and private capital, it is necessary to interpret K as an amalgam of physical and human capital, with 
(1 ) l −  describing “raw” unskilled labor; see Rebelo (1991).   
12For example, Origueira and Santos (1997) choose h1 = 16 on the grounds that it generates a plausible speed of 
convergence.  Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) assume h1 = 10, recognizing that this is at the low values of estimates, 
while Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) propose a value above 10.  13 
Table 1, Row 1 summarizes these in a more convenient form.  Thus the benchmark equilibrium 
yields a steady-state ratio of public to private capital of 0.25, a consumption-output ratio of 0.60, and 
a debt-output ratio of 0.42, yielding an equilibrium borrowing premium of 2.13 percent over the 
world rate of 6 percent.  The capital-output ratio is 2.97, and 78 percent of the agent’s time is 
allocated to leisure, consistent with empirical evidence, yielding a long-run growth rate of 1.65 
percent.  This equilibrium is a reasonable characterization of a small-medium indebted economy, 
experiencing a modest steady growth rate and having a relatively small stock of public capital.   
This equilibrium is based on several specific assumptions and therefore it is important to 
conduct some sensitivity analysis.  The critical parameters upon which we focus are: (i) the elasticity 
of substitution in production, s, (ii) the elasticity of leisure in utility, θ, (iii)  the externality 
parameter, ε , and (iv) the domestic fiscal policy parameters,  , g τ . 
3.1.  A Permanent Increase in the Flow of Foreign Aid: Long Run Effects   
We now introduce a permanent foreign aid flow to the above benchmark economy.   
Specifically, the inflow of foreign aid is tied to the scale of the recipient economy, and increases 
from 0 percent of GDP in the initial steady-state to 5 percent of GDP in the new steady-state (an 
increase in σ  from 0 to 0.05).
13  This aid may be tied to new investment in public capital (φ = 1), 
representing a “productive” transfer, or it may be untied (φ = 0), in which case it is a “pure” transfer.  
The long-run and short-run responses of key variables in the recipient economy are reported in Rows 
2 and 3 in Tables 1a and 1b.  In addition, the final columns in the tables summarize the effects on 
long-run welfare, [ ] W ∆ , and short-run welfare, [ (0)] W ∆ , both measured by the optimized utility of 
the representative agent where C and l are evaluated along the equilibrium path.  These welfare 
changes are measures of equivalent variation, calculated as the percentage change in the initial stock 
of capital necessary to maintain the level of welfare unchanged following the particular shock.  The 
differences between the effects of the two types of transfer are dramatic. 
We first consider the long-run effects of an increase in foreign aid (Table1a) and then discuss 
                                                 
13 While  0.05 σ =  is arbitrary it is approximately the average rate of foreign aid offered by the European Union under its 
aid program to prospective members in the early 1990s and thus serves as a reasonable benchmark. 14 
the short-run transitional dynamics generated by this shock (Table 1b and Figure 1).   
3.1.1 Tied  Aid 
  The long-run impact of a tied foreign aid shock is reported in Row 2 of Table 1a.  Since the 
aid is tied directly to public investment, in the new steady state the ratio of public to private capital 
more than doubles, increasing from 0.25 to 0.54, as a consequence of the investment boom in 
infrastructure.  The larger stock of public capital increases the marginal productivity of private 
capital and labor, leading to a positive, though lesser, accumulation of private capital, and increasing 
employment time from 0.220 to 0.232.  Although the transfer stimulates consumption through a 
wealth effect, the enhanced productive capacity has a greater effect on output, leading to a decline in 
the long-run consumption-output ratio from 0.60 to 0.563.  The higher productivity raises the long-
run growth rate to 2.31 percent, while long-run welfare improves by 7.96 percent.  The increased 
accumulation of both private and public capital lead to a higher demand for external borrowing as a 
means of financing the new investment in private capital and the installation costs of public capital.  
This results in an increase in the steady state debt-output ratio from 0.42 to 0.62, raising the 
borrowing premium to nearly 3.8 percent.  However, this higher debt relative to output is sustainable 
since it is caused by higher investment demand rather than by higher consumption demand.  The 
long run increase in the economy’s productive capacity (as measured by the larger stocks of public 
and private capital, and output) ensures that the additional debt is sustainable.
14   
3.1.2    Untied Aid 
A permanent untied aid shock, i.e., an aid flow not tied to any investment activity, has 
precisely the opposite qualitative effects, as illustrated in Row 3 of Table 1a.  Apart from 
consumption and leisure, the changes are much smaller.  Being untied, the transfer is devoted to debt 
reduction, thereby allowing an increase in consumption.  The debt-output ratio declines to 0.396 and 
the consumption-output ratio rises to around 0.65.  The increase in consumption raises the marginal 
utility of leisure, increasing the fraction of leisure time from 0.78 to 0.793.  Since the aid no longer 
                                                 
14 This view has also been expressed by Roubini and Wachtel (1998). 15 
favors public investment, the ratio of public to private capital remains virtually unchanged.  With the 
shift toward more consumption and leisure, productivity of both types of capital decline and the 
equilibrium growth rate is marginally reduced from 1.65% to 1.60%, leading to an overall increase 
in welfare of around 7.71 percent, marginally less than for the tied transfer. 
3.2      Transitional Dynamics 
3.2.1 Tied  Aid 
The transitional adjustment paths following the increase in tied aid are illustrated in Fig. 1 for 
the benchmark economy.  Fig. 1.1 illustrates the stable adjustment locus in z-n space, indicating how 
z and n both generally increase together during the transition.  
The immediate effect of the tied aid shock is to raise the growth of public capital, to above 8 
percent, thereby raising the productivity of both private capital and labor; see Table 1b, Row 2.  
Given the cost of borrowing, the higher return to capital causes an instantaneous upward jump in the 
shadow price of private capital, q, from its initial benchmark level of 2 to 2.04, thereby inducing a 
corresponding increase in private investment.  At the same time, the higher productivity of labor 
induces an immediate, but slight, decline in leisure from 0.780 to 0.777.  While the upward jump in 
q reduces the rate of return on private capital, the increase in labor raises the return.  On balance, the 
former slightly dominates and immediately after its initial increase, q begins to drop slightly to 
around 2.03, after the first five periods.  Leisure drops steadily toward its new equilibrium level of 
0.768, so that after a few periods its positive productivity effect dominates, and q begins to rise 
monotonically toward its new equilibrium level of 2.10; see Figs. 1.2 and 1.3.   
The introduction of the tied transfer leads to an initial short-run decline in the consumption-
output ratio [Fig. 1.4].  This is because the short-run substitution from leisure to labor both increases 
output and reduces the marginal utility of consumption.  Thereafter, as the larger capital stocks are 
reflected in more output, the consumption-output ratio continues to decline monotonically toward its 
new steady-state value.  Also, note that leisure and the consumption-output ratio move together.  The 
contrasting time paths of the four growth rates,  , , , and  K GY C ψ ψψ ψ during the transition toward 
their common long-run growth rate of 2.31 percent are strikingly illustrated in Fig. 1.6.  With public 16 
capital being directly stimulated by the transfer, its growth rate jumps initially to over 8.3 percent 
before gradually declining.  By contrast, private capital increases only very gradually from 1.95 
percent to 2.31 percent during transition, as the accumulation of public capital enhances its 
productivity.  As a result, the ratio of public to private capital increases at a steady monotonic rate.  
The growth rate of output is a weighted average of the growth rates of the two capital stocks plus the 
temporary growth of labor and therefore immediately increases sharply to 3.5 percent with the 
transfer.  On the other hand, the only influence on the initial growth rate of consumption is the effect 
that operates through the labor supply and the labor-leisure choice, raising its growth rate from 1.65 
percent to 1.87 percent.  Thereafter it responds only gradually, in response to the accumulation of 
assets in the economy.  It always lies below the growth rate of output, so that CY is falling, as 
noted in Fig. 1.4.  However, the level of consumption is still growing, albeit at a modest rate. 
The final aspect of the dynamics concerns the debt-output ratio.  Starting at 0.42, the short-
run increase in output leads to a slight initial decline in the debt-output ratio, after which it increases 
monotonically through time.  This is because the accumulation of public capital raises the average 
productivity of private capital, while the accumulation of both types of capital raises the need to 
borrow from abroad to finance new investment and installation costs.  But as noted in Section 3.1.1, 
the higher debt, being backed by higher productive capacity through the tied transfer, is sustainable. 
3.2.2    Untied Aid 
  The transitional dynamics following an untied aid shock are illustrated in Figure 2 and three 
points should be made at the outset, which distinguish our results from earlier findings.  First, the 
existence of transitional dynamics following an untied aid shock depends crucially upon the 
endogeneity of labor supply.  If labor supply is inelastic, then untied foreign aid has no dynamic or 
growth effects and the economy moves instantaneously to its new steady-state via a once-and-for-all 
increase in the consumption-output ratio; see Chatterjee et al. (2003).  Second, the dynamics in 
response to untied aid are in sharp contrast to those generated by tied aid, being more or less the 
reverse.  This reflects the fact, noted in Table 2, that the long-run responses of the economy to the 
two types of aid are generally opposite in nature.  Third, the dynamic adjustment generally occurs 17 
much more rapidly than in response to the tied aid shock.   
  Fig. 2.1 illustrates the transitional adjustment paths for the two state variables, debt/private 
capital and public capital/private capital.  We see that on receipt of the aid, these move in opposite 
directions, implying that on impact the debt-capital ratio begins to decline, while the public-private 
capital ratio begins to increase.  Indeed, the untied transfer is initially applied primarily to debt 
reduction, which allows an immediate substantial increase in consumption, increasing the marginal 
utility of leisure, and thus inducing an immediate sharp reduction in labor supply.   
The main impact of an untied transfer is on consumption, leisure, and debt reduction, as 
illustrated in Figs. 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5.  Its initial impact is to raise the marginal utility of leisure causing 
a reduction in labor supply, and hence in the productivity of private and public capital, and in q.  The 
receipt of the untied transfer has a slightly less adverse short-run effect on the growth rate of public 
capital, reducing it to 1.57 percent, slightly above that of private capital.  As z increases, the 
productivity of public capital declines relative to private capital, causing their relative growth rates 
to reverse.  After just over two periods the growth rate of private capital exceeds that of public 
capital and z begins to decline with n.  The decline in q is partially reversed during the subsequent 
transition as the relative stock of public to private capital declines.   
4. Sensitivity  Analysis 
  The contrast between the effects of tied and untied foreign aid is striking.  It is therefore 
important to determine how sensitive this comparison is to the chosen parameter values for the 
benchmark economy.  This is explored in Tables 2 – 5, along the various dimensions noted earlier.
15 
4.1  Elasticity of substitution in production (s) versus flexibility in labor supply () θ  
Table 2 presents a grid summarizing the changes in key variables in response to equal 
amounts of tied aid and untied aid, respectively, as the elasticity of substitution in production, s, 
                                                 
15 In our earlier work, with fixed labor supply, we conducted sensitivity analysis with respect to the adjustment costs of 
public capital as well as the degree of capital market imperfections.  We have also addressed these aspects here, but since 
the conclusions are basically unchanged from those obtained previously, we omit them from our discussion.   18 
varies between 0.8 and 1.6, while θ  varies between 0 and 2.
16  One interesting feature is that the 
effects of tied aid on the growth rate are highly sensitive to even minor deviations from the 
benchmark value of  1 s =  (Cobb-Douglas).  Thus, for example, if a researcher estimates  1 s =  with a 
standard error of 0.1 – a tight estimate - and if  1 θ = , then, with 95 percent probability the implied 
increase of 0.66 percentage points in the growth rate could be as high as 0.98 or as low as 0.45.  A 
sustained difference in the growth rate of half a percentage point accumulates to a substantial 
difference in economic performance.  This is seen from the spread on the implied welfare gain of 
7.96 percent, which is even larger, ranging as high as 21.1 percent and as low as 0.53 percent. 
Looking though the two panels of Table 2, the following observations can be made. 
(i)   The tendency for tied and untied aid to have opposite long-run effects on economic 
activity is robust to variations in s and θ . 
(ii)    Tied aid has substantially greater long-run effects on variables involving asset 
accumulation [capital aid and foreign debt], than does untied aid.  The effects on consumption and 
leisure are comparable in magnitude (though opposite in direction). 
(iii)  Increasing the elasticity of substitution, s, reduces the positive effect of tied aid on the 
growth rate, while reducing the negative effect on the consumption-output and capital-output ratios.  
On the other hand, a higher s primarily reduces the adverse effect of an untied aid shock on the debt-
output ratio, while decreasing the positive effects on the capital-output and consumption-output 
ratios, the latter only mildly.  The net effect is to reduce the adverse effect on the growth rate.  
Intuitively, the larger the elasticity of substitution, the more the increased productivity of 
private capital resulting from the tied transfer induces substitution toward private capital.  As a 
result, the YK  ratio rises less, so that the increased productivity of private capital is reduced, thus 
reducing its rate of accumulation, and mitigating the fall in consumption.  For untied aid, a higher 
elasticity of substitution means that the reduction in the productivity of private capital resulting from 
the reduction in labor supply is mitigated, so that the fall in the growth rate is moderated.  Slower 
                                                 
16 We have extended the sensitivity analysis to include 5 θ = , but the pattern remains unchanged. 19 
growth means less borrowing, lower borrowing costs, and thus a decline in the debt-output ratio.   
(iv)   Increasing the importance of leisure in utility, θ , reduces the positive effect of tied 
aid on the growth rate, and reduces the adverse effect on the consumption-output and capital-output 
ratios.  It increases the adverse effect of untied aid on the growth rate, while reducing the positive 
effect on the capital-output ratio and the adverse effect on the debt-output ratio.   
The intuition is as follows.  The more the agent values leisure in utility, the less they are 
willing to reduce it in response to an increase in tied aid, the less the reduction in consumption, and 
the less the positive effect on the growth rate.  In the case of untied aid, as θ  increases, and agents 
enjoy more leisure, the productivity of capital and the return on capital decline, so the adverse effect 
on the growth rate increases. However, there are some offsetting effects.  As leisure increases, 
because of its diminishing marginal utility, agents increase their leisure at a diminishing rate.  This 
mitigates the adverse effect of the untied aid on the growth rate, for sufficiently large θ .
17 
4.2 Welfare  Comparisons 
The comparison of the overall intertemporal welfare gains for the two types of aid is 
particularly striking.  Table 3 indicates that for the benchmark case,  1, 1 s θ = = , the net effects of the 
two types of aid on intertemporal welfare are more or less comparable;  the gains from tied aid are 
7.96 percent, while those from untied aid are 7.71 percent.  But despite this similarity in the overall 
intertemporal welfare gains for the two forms of aid, the contrasting dynamic adjustments in the 
economy lead to sharp differences in the time-profiles of the benefits they provide. For tied aid, the 
commitment toward public investment involves initial consumption losses and less leisure, leading 
to a short-run welfare loss of 1.53 percent.  Over time, as the economy becomes more productive, 
consumption increases rapidly.  Welfare increases drasmaically, with subsequent gains dominating 
                                                 
17 One result in Table 2 worth noting is the contrast in the response of leisure to an increase in tied aid as s increases 
from 0.8 to 1.6.  As already noted, if  1 s = , a tied transfer, by increasing labor productivity, encourages more work 
effort, an effect that is exacerbated as the elasticity of substitution increases beyond 1.  For low s, however, this response 
is reversed. The intuition is seen most clearly by focusing on the polar case of the fixed coefficient production function, 
0 s = .  In this case, private capital, K, and labor in efficiency units, (1 ) g lK − , need to change proportionately.  Since tied 
aid leads to an increase in the relative stock,  g zKK ≡ , this must be accompanied by a decrease in labor for (1 ) lz −  to 
remain constant and for production to remain efficient. 20 
the initial losses, resulting in an overall intertemporal welfare gain.  In contrast, the response to 
untied aid does not involve intertemporal trade-offs.  Instead, it results in an immediate and an more 
almost constant increase in consumption, leisure, and therefore welfare, along the transition path. 
Table 3 presents the sensitivity of the short-run and long-run welfare responses to the two 
types of aid shocks, for variations in s and θ .  The following patterns emerge from the table: 
(i)  Both the short-run and the intertemporal welfare gains from an untied aid shock are 
remarkably insensitive to variations in both s and θ .  For plausible ranges of the parameters, an 
untied aid flow equal to 5 percent of GDP leads to short-run welfare gains of between 7-9 percent 
and long-run gains over the range of  5-10 percent, both measured by an equivalent variation in the 
initial stock of capital.  The long-run gains are typically within 1 percentage point of the short-run 
gains suggesting a gradual increase over time. 
(ii)  In contrast, both the short-run and long-run welfare gains from a tied aid of the same 
magnitude are highly sensitive to both parameters. For any given θ , the long-run welfare gains 
decline with s.  On the other hand, welfare gains increase with θ  for values of s less than 1.  For 
high values of s, tied aid yields both short-run and long-run losses, the former being relatively 
independent of θ , and the latter increasing with θ .  There is therefore a sharp contrast between the 
short-run and long-run welfare effects of tied aid. 
  Results (i) and (ii) from Table 3 are two key findings, and the following intuition may be 
provided.  An untied aid flow has little effect on the stocks of public or private capital.  The higher 
elasticity of substitution raises the level of output attainable from given stocks of capital, thereby 
raising consumption and welfare approximately uniformly.  If the aid flow is tied, it increases the 
rate of investment in public capital.  With a low elasticity of substitution this requires an 
approximately corresponding increase in private capital, leading to a large increase in output, 
consumption, and benefits.  As the elasticity of substitution increases, the higher public capital is 
associated with a smaller increase in private capital, so that the increase in output, consumption, and 
welfare declines.  This is exacerbated by the fact that for a high elasticity of substitution, the tied 
transfer generates a large increase in the real wage and its growth rate, leading to substantial 21 
substitution toward labor, which is further welfare-reducing. 
The contrasting sensitivities of the welfare gains resulting from a tied and untied transfer, 
respectively, to changes in s and θ , means that the relative merits of the two forms of transfers, from 
a welfare standpoint, are also highly sensitive to these two critical parameters.  To consider this, we 
shall focus on the benchmark case s = 1, and consider variations in θ .  As we have already noted, 
for  1 θ = , tied aid is marginally superior to untied aid from a long-run (intertemporal) welfare point 
of view.  But as θ  declines and leisure becomes less important in utility, untied aid is superior to 
tied aid.  Indeed in the limiting case of inelastic labor supply, θ  = 0, an untied aid shock generates a 
long-run welfare gain of 8.66 percent, while the corresponding gain from a tied aid shock is much 
lower, at 6 percent.  The less (more) important is leisure in utility, the more (less) tied aid crowds out 
private consumption, thus decreasing (increasing) the benefits, relative to untied aid.  This 
comparison is sensitive to even small variations in the elasticity of substitution.  For example, if 
0.8 s =  tied aid dominates untied aid (intertemporally), irrespective of the importance of leisure 
(even for  5 θ = ), while if  1.2 s =  precisely the reverse is true.   
4.3  Generalizations of the Production Function 
  Table 4 extends the comparison of the long-run welfare effects of tied and untied aid by 
allowing public capital to have the additional externality effect as introduced in (1a).  The main 
message of these results is clear and unsurprising.  While the benefits of untied aid are relatively 
insensitive to ε  (being mildly negative), the benefits of tied aid are highly sensitive to this effect, so 
that the latter is heavily favored as ε  increases.  Take, for example, the benchmark case,  1, 1 s θ = = .  
Whereas tied aid is only marginally superior in the absence of this effect, it clearly dominates for 
0.1 ε =  (7.51% vs. 18.50%).  Moreover, in cases where for  0 ε =  untied aid dominates tied aid, and 
where the latter is welfare-deteriorating, tied aid may now not only be positive from a welfare 
standpoint but may also be superior to untied aid.  An example of this arises if  1.6, 0.2 s ε == .
18 
                                                 
18 We have also conducted sensitivity analysis using the generalized Romer production function in footnote 4.  If  0 ε =  
in that model, tied aid is clearly undesirable, since it is obliging the recipient economy to devote the resources to an 
unproductive use.  But if ε  is sufficiently large (e.g. around 0.2) it is again the case that tied aid is not only beneficial, 
but also superior to untied aid. 22 
4.4  Sensitivity of Transitional Dynamics 
We have recomputed the transitional paths for both types of aid to determine their sensitivity 
to variations in s and θ , as well as to ε .  For untied aid, the time profiles retain the general 
qualitative characteristics, illustrated in Fig. 2 for the benchmark  1 s θ = = , as  , , s θ  and ε  are varied.  
Many of the qualitative characteristics of the transitional paths following a tied aid shock also 
remain as illustrated in Fig. 1, although there are some substantive differences which are illustrated 
in Figs. 3 and 4.   
The transitional time paths for leisure and the consumption-output ratio following a tied aid 
shock are sensitive to variations in the elasticity of substitution (s), and Fig. 3 compares them for 
three values of  0.5, 1, and 1.6 s = , while θ  remains at its benchmark value of unity.  As already 
observed, for the benchmark economy, l and CY move together.  For a low elasticity of 
substitution ( 0.5 s = ), leisure generally increases, for reasons discussed in Section 4.1.  The initial 
increase in leisure increases the marginal utility of consumption, so that CY initially increases, 
after which it declines steadily.  This implies that l and CY move in opposite directions throughout 
the transition.  For a high elasticity of substitution, l initially declines and continues to decline during 
the transition, just as in the benchmark case.  But in this case, the initial decline in l is sufficiently 
sharp to cause a sharp decline in initial consumption,  (0) C .  The CY ratio overshoots its long-run 
response, and thus rises during the transition, implying again that l and CY move in opposite 
directions throughout the transition. 
Fig. 4 highlights the role played by the real wage rate, in the absorption and propagation of a 
tied aid shock.  This turns out to be sensitive to elasticity of leisure in utility (θ ) and we consider 
three values of θ  = 0, 1, and 5, while maintaining s = 1.  When θ  = 0, the agent allocates all of his 
time to work, and as we have shown previously, the aid shock does not generate any adjustment in 
the work-leisure choice (Fig. 4.1).  On the other hand, the resulting increase in the productivity of 
public capital causes the growth rate of the real wage to increase instantaneously and to overshoot its 
higher long-run equilibrium (Fig. 4.2).  Since the agent devotes all his time to work, diminishing 
returns set in during transition, causing a gradual decline in the growth of the real wage rate, until it 
finally converges to the new steady-state growth rate of the economy.  As θ  increases (Figs. 4.2, 23 
4.3,  1 θ = ), the agent divides his time between work and leisure, and the effect of the tied aid shock 
on the real wage rate is altered.  The agent now substitutes away from leisure toward longer work-
hours.  The positive opportunity cost of this substitution dampens the response of the growth rate of 
the real wage rate, and it undershoots its higher long-run equilibrium.  Thereafter, the accumulation 
of public capital during transition increases the productivity of labor, causing a gradual increase in 
real wage-growth during transition.  For a very high value of θ  (Fig. 4.5), the instantaneous 
response of leisure is to jump up before declining towards its lower long-run equilibrium.  The 
upward jump in the growth rate of the real wage is consequently much smaller. 
5.  Consequences for the Government Fiscal Balance 
  One issue of debate in the aid-growth literature concerns the relationship between the 
effectiveness of foreign aid and “good” government policy.  In examining this relationship 
empirically, Burnside and Dollar (2000) construct an index of good policy, which includes the 
budget surplus as one factor.  Our model enables us to address this issue in the following way. 
  Recalling equation (7), T represents the amount of lump-sum taxation (or transfers) necessary 
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The issue then is the effect of tied and untied aid on this measure.  Table 5 summarizes the effects of 
tied and untied aid on both intertemporal welfare, W, and the government’s intertemporal balance, V, 
for varying domestic fiscal configurations.  A number of important insights emerge, where we focus 
first on Panel A. 24 
(i)  The welfare benefits from untied aid are relatively insensitive to substantial variations 
in both the tax rate and the rate of government spending, decreasing mildly with the former and 
increasing mildly with the latter.  In addition, untied aid always improves the government’s 
intertemporal fiscal balance and thus is beneficial from that standpoint.   
(ii)  The welfare benefits from tied aid increase slightly with the tax rate but decrease 
dramatically with the rate of government spending.  This is because the benefits from tied aid 
depend critically upon the level of domestic government spending ( ) g on public capital relative to 
the socially optimal level which, in turn, depends upon the tax rate.  For example, for  0.15 τ = , the 
socially optimal fraction of government spending in the absence of foreign aid is  0.098 g = .
19  If 
0.02 g = , government investment is far below the optimum and clearly foreign aid tied to public 
investment is highly desirable; if  0.05 g = , the tied aid raises total public investment to 0.10, which 
is close to the social optimum and therefore still desirable. But if  0.10 g = , the rate of public 
investment is above the social optimum and any further tied aid is welfare-reducing.
20 
(iii)  Tied aid always worsens the government’s intertemporal deficit and is not desirable 
from that standpoint.
21  Thus for low rates of government expenditure tied aid involves a tradeoff in 
that increased wealth is accompanied by a higher intertemporal government deficit.  For high rates of 
government expenditure, tied aid is unambiguously bad in that it is both welfare deteriorating and 
also deteriorates the government’s intertemporal balance.  In contrast, untied aid always has a 
positive effect on both targets. 
(iv)  The larger is the current government surplus, as parameterized by  g τ − , the more 
(less) beneficial is tied (untied) aid.  “Good” policy in the Burnside-Dollar sense thus favors tied aid. 
(v)  For extreme rates of expenditure optimal policy involves corner solutions.  Thus for 
0.02 g =  tied aid is not only superior but maximizes welfare, while for  0.10 g = , untied aid is 
optimal.  For  0.05 g = , the optimal policy is an interior mix.  Thus for  0.15 τ = , the optimal is for 
                                                 
19 This is obtained numerically. For  0.1, 0.2 τ =  the socially optimal expenditures are 0.091 and 0.106, respectively. 
20 Since the total rate of public investment is  g φσ + , the benefits of tied aid also depend upon its size, σ , since like  g , 
too large an increase in σ  will take  g φσ +  beyond the social optimum rate of public investment.  There is, in effect a 
tradeoff between  g  and σ  insofar as the benefit of tied foreign aid is concerned. 
21 This result can also be established analytically by considering (12) in the case  1 φ = .  An important element for this 
result is the fact that tied aid also imposes installation costs, the government needs to finance.  25 
53% of the aid to be tied and the remainder untied.  While this will take the economy to below the 
optimal rate of government investment, the losses from this are more than compensated by the fact 
that this is associated with a reduction in the government’s intertemporal fiscal balance. 
Panel B yields a similar pattern in the case of a positive externality  0.2 ε = .  The main 
difference is that the existence of this externality raises the productivity of public capital.  In this 
case the socially optimal rates of public investment are 0.120, 0.130, and 0.138, corresponding to 
0.10, 0.15, 0.20 τ = , respectively.  Hence the tied transfer remains optimal even if  0.05 g = .  
6. Conclusions 
The link between foreign aid, economic growth, and welfare depends crucially on the 
mechanism through which a particular aid program, whether tied or untied, is absorbed by the 
recipient economy.  In this paper, we introduce two crucial aspects of this mechanism that have been 
absent from previous work.  First, we highlight the importance of the endogeneity of labor supply as 
an additional margin through which foreign aid may impact on macroeconomic performance.   
Second, we focus on (i) the role played by the interaction of labor supply and public capital, and (ii) 
externalities associated with public capital accumulation in determining an economy’s response to a 
foreign aid shock.  In addition, we are also able to relate our theoretical model to the recent empirical 
literature by examining the impact of an underlying aid program on the recipient government’s 
intertemporal fiscal deficit.  While recent work by Chatterjee et al. (2003) and Chatterjee and 
Turnovsky (2004) has highlighted the role played by an economy’s structural conditions in the 
absorption of aid, we view the current paper as further enhancing our understanding of the aid-
growth link by focusing on the role played by relative prices (of consumption and leisure), 
production externalities, and the government’s fiscal balance.  
We conclude with two final comments.  First, our results carry some important policy advice.  
They suggest that when donors decide on whether a particular aid program should be tied to an 
investment activity, careful attention should be paid to the recipient’s opportunities for substitution 
in production, the elasticity of labor supply, and production externalities.  It is perfectly possible for 
a tied transfer to have a presumably unintended adverse effect on the recipient economy, if that 26 
economy is structurally different from what the donor perceived.  Second, we have abstracted 
entirely from any political economy factors relating to rent-seeking or corruption, which are clearly 
relevant issues in any foreign aid discussion.  Recent work by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and 
others show that the existence of “political elites” and powerful interest groups in poor economies 
may be a deterrent to investment, technological change, and economic development.  Further, the 
lack of institutions may also inhibit the effects of aid on growth.  Clearly, the consequences of these 
are significant considerations for determining both the nature and composition of foreign aid and are 
important directions for future research. Table 1:  Permanent Foreign Aid Shock  
Benchmark Equilibrium: Cobb-Douglas production function (s = 1) 
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b. Short-run Effects 
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 Table 2 
 
A.  Sensitivity of Permanent Responses to the Elasticities of Substitution (s) and Leisure (θ) 
 
(i) Tied Aid Shock: σ  increases from 0 to 0.05, φ  = 1 
 
  s  = 0.8  s = 1  s = 1.2  s = 1.6 
N Y     
l d
~    ( ) Y C d
~   ( ) Y N d
~    ( ) Y K d
~   dψ   
 
l d
~    ( ) Y C d
~   ( ) Y N d
~    ( ) Y K d
~   dψ   
 
l d
~      ( ) Y C d
~   ( ) Y N d
~    ( ) Y K d
~    dψ   
 
l d
~      ( ) Y C d
~   ( ) Y N d
~   ( ) Y K d
~   dψ    
θ  = 0  0         -0.065   0.194     -0.35     1.03  0          -0.047   0.103    -0.30    0.741  0          -0.036    0.053     -0.266    0.566  0          -0.024    0.003    -0.227    0.375 
θ  = 1  0.009  -0.054   0.419     -0.630   0.984 -0.012  -0.039   0.206   -0.446   0.657  -0.026  -0.029    0.101     -0.327    0.446  -0.041  -0.024    0.019    -0.192    0.223 
θ  = 2  0.007  -0.046   0.572    -0.814    0.939 -0.007  -0.035   0.254   -0.507   0.608  -0.015  -0.028    0.111     -0.327    0.385  -0.017  -0.025    0.017    -0.147    0.158 
 
  
(ii) Untied Aid Shock: σ  increases from 0 to 0.05, φ  = 0 
 
  s  = 0.8  s = 1  s = 1.2  s = 1.6 
  
l d
~    ( ) Y C d
~   ( ) Y N d
~    ( ) Y K d
~   dψ   
 
l d
~    ( ) Y C d
~   ( ) Y N d
~    ( ) Y K d
~   dψ   
 
l d
~      ( ) Y C d
~   ( ) Y N d
~    ( ) Y K d
~    dψ   
 
l d
~      ( ) Y C d
~   ( ) Y N d
~   ( ) Y K d
~   dψ    
θ  = 0  0           0.05        0            0           0  0           0.05        0           0            0  0           0.05          0               0           0  0           0.05         0             0            0 
θ  = 1  0.014   0.052  -0.038    0.055    -0.069 0.014   0.051  -0.020    0.042   -0.053  0.013   0.05     -0.011       0.032   -0.039  0.010   0.049    -0.002      0.018   -0.020 
θ  = 2  0.009   0.052  -0.058    0.080    -0.073 0.008   0.051  -0.028    0.053   -0.055  0.007   0.05     -0.012       0.034   -0.037  0.004   0.050    -0.002      0.014   -0.015 
 
 
  Table 3 
 
Sensitivity of Short-run and Long-run Welfare Responses to the Elasticities of Substitution (s) and Leisure (θ) 
 
(i) Tied Aid: σ  increases from 0 to 0.05, φ  = 1 
 
  s  = 0.8  s = 1  s = 1.2  s = 1.6 
  
( ) 0 W ∆⎡ ⎤ ⎣⎦    ( ) W ∆  
 
( ) 0 W ∆⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦         ( ) W ∆
 
( ) 0 W ∆⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦      ( ) W ∆
 
( ) 0 W ∆⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦      ( ) W ∆
θ  = 0  0.71               10.18  -3.97                    6.00  -7.76                 1.06  -13.04              -3.14 
θ  = 1  5.14               21.08  -1.53                    7.96  -6.71                 0.53  -12.56              -6.82 
θ  = 2  7.03               26.46  -0.69                    9.15  -6.55                 0.16  -12.52              -7.68 
 
  
(ii) Untied Aid: σ  increases from 0 to 0.05, φ  = 0 
 
  s  = 0.8  s = 1  s = 1.2  s = 1.6 
  
( ) 0 W ∆⎡⎤ ⎣⎦         ( ) W ∆  
 
( ) 0 W ∆⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦       ( ) W ∆  
 
() 0 W ∆⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦      ( ) W ∆
 
( ) 0 W ∆⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦    ( ) W ∆  
θ  = 0  8.24                    8.24  8.66                   8.66  8.94                  8.94  9.28                9.28 
θ  = 1  7.49                    6.47  8.32                   7.71  8.94                  8.55  9.70                9.52 
θ  = 2  7.22                    5.89  8.21                   7.50  8.94                  8.54  9.78                9.64 
 
 Table 4 
 
Sensitivity of Long-run Welfare Responses to the Elasticities 
 of Substitution (s), Leisure (θ), and the Public Capital Externality ( ε ) 
(percentage changes in welfare, σ  increases from 0 to 0.05) 
 
 (i)  0.02 ε =  
 
  s  = 0.8  s = 1  s = 1.2  s = 1.6 
  0 φ =             1 φ =   0 φ =             1 φ =   0 φ =            1 φ =   0 φ =            1 φ =  
θ  = 0  8.21               12.10  8.63                 6.33  8.91                2.68  9.25               -1.68 
θ  = 1  6.44               23.46  7.67                 9.89  8.51                2.24  9.47               -5.31 
θ  = 2  5.86               29.11  7.46               11.16  8.50                1.88  9.59               -6.16 
 
 (ii)  0.05 ε =  
 
  s  = 0.8  s = 1  s = 1.2  s = 1.6 
  0 φ =            1 φ =   0 φ =            1 φ =   0 φ =            1 φ =   0 φ =            1 φ =  
θ  = 0  8.16              15.12  8.58                9.05  8.86               5.20  9.19                0.60 
θ  = 1  6.39              27.84  7.61              12.94  8.43               4.91  9.39              -2.93 
θ  = 2  5.82              33.34  7.40              14.34  8.42               4.57  9.50              -3.78 
 
 
(iii)  0.1 ε =  
 
  s  = 0.8  s = 1  s = 1.2  s = 1.6 
  0 φ =            1 φ =   0 φ =            1 φ =   0 φ =            1 φ =   0 φ =            1 φ =  
θ  = 0  8.08              20.57        8.49                  13.93  8.77              9.70  9.09               4.65 
θ  = 1  6.30              34.21  7.51                  18.50  8.32              9.73  9.25               1.33 
θ  = 2  5.75              41.17  7.31                  20.18  8.32              9.46  9.37               0.51 
 
  
(iv)  0.2 ε =  
 
  s  = 0.8  s = 1  s = 1.2  s = 1.6 
  0 φ =               1 φ =   0 φ =               1 φ = 0 φ =              1 φ =   0 φ =             1 φ =  
θ  = 0  7.94                  33.43  8.33                   25.31 8.59                 20.11  8.90               13.89 
θ  = 1  6.15                 51.30  7.31                   31.90 8.10                 21.19  8.99               11.32 
θ  = 2  6.37                60.63  7.14                   34.36 8.12                 21.11  9.12               10.59 
 Table.5:  Sensitivity of Foreign Aid Shocks to Domestic Fiscal Structure 
(Cobb-Douglas production function, σ  increases from 0 to 0.05) 
 
A.  0 ε =  
 
  0.02 g =   0.05 g =   0.10 g =  
 Tied  Aid 
( 1 is opt) φ =
 
Untied Aid 
(0 ) φ =  
Tied Aid 
(1 ) φ =  
Untied Aid 




(1 ) φ =  
Untied Aid 
( 0 is opt) φ =
 
  W ∆      V ∆   W ∆      V ∆   W ∆      V ∆   W ∆      V ∆   W ∆     V ∆       ˆ φ   W ∆      V ∆ W ∆      V ∆  
0.10 τ =   26.97    0.87  7.26     -0.76  7.16      0.57  8.23     -0.58  8.89    0.13    0.39  -2.68    0.45  10.35   -0.48 
0.15 τ =   27.73    1.09  6.87     -0.84  7.96      0.66  7.71     -0.64  8.92    0.07    0.53  -1.51    0.49   9.53    -0.52 
0.20 τ =   28.45    1.37  6.51     -0.94  8.70      0.77  7.25     -0.70  9.12    0.32    0.68  -0.50    0.54   8.82    -0.56 
 
 
B.  0.10 ε =  
 
  0.02 g =   0.05 g =   0.10 g =  
 Tied  Aid 
( 1 is opt) φ =
 
Untied Aid 
(0 ) φ =  
Tied Aid  
( 1 is opt) φ =
 
Untied Aid 
(0 ) φ =  
Tied Aid 
(1 ) φ =  
Untied Aid 
( 0 is opt) φ =
 
  W ∆      V ∆   W ∆      V ∆   W ∆      V ∆   W ∆      V ∆   W ∆      V ∆   W ∆       V ∆  
0.10 τ =   54.43    1.24  7.06     -1.14  17.69     0.63  7.98     -0.71  2.11      0.45  10.11    -0.51 
0.15 τ =   55.35    1.77  6.71     -1.28  18.50     0.79  7.51     -0.78  3.27      0.50   9.34     -0.56 
0.20 τ =   56.23    2.46  6.39     -1.45  19.26     0.99  7.08     -0.86  4.30      0.58   8.66     -0.61 
 
 Figure 3: Sensitivity of Dynamics of Leisure-Consumption to 
                               Elasticity of Substitution (tied aid)





























































I. Leisure II.  Consumption-Output RatioFigure 4: Sensitivity of Basic Dynamics to 
                   Elasticity of Substitution
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  This Appendix provides the detailed derivations of the macrodynamic equilibrium 
A.1  Derivation of the Equilibrium Relationships (9a) – (9d) 







ε ρ ρ ρ αη η
− − − ⎛⎞ ⎡ ⎤ =− + − ⎜⎟ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎝⎠
   (1a) 
The marginal rate of substitution between C and l is given by: 








− ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ = ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ −− ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
           (A.1) 
where,  () G A KK
ε
α = .  Next, we recall the definition of  () () [ ] ,( 1 ) ( 1 ) zl lz
ρ
ηη Ω≡ Ω = − − given 
in (10a).  Substituting this into the production function (1a), and into (A.1) we can express the 
output-capital ratio and consumption-capital ratios in the form 
() ( )
1
(,) 1 1 YK y yzl z l
ρ ρ ε αη η
− − ⎡ ⎤ ≡= = − + − ⎣ ⎦     ( A . 2 a )  








− ⎛⎞ ⎡ ⎤ ≡= = ⎜⎟ ⎢ ⎥ −+ Ω ⎝⎠ ⎣ ⎦
     ( A . 2 b )  
Then, differentiating the optimality condition, (3a), the marginal rate of substitution 
condition, (A.1), the production function (1a), all with respect to time, and recalling (4a), yields 
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     ( A . 3 c )   
A2 
Combining these four equations together with (3c’) and (6’), we can eliminate the growth rates, 
,, , , GG CCKKK K YY     and  λ λ   and express the dynamics of leisure by the differential equation: 
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   (A.5b) 
Using (A.3a) and (A.4) we can express the growth rate of consumption as 
  ( )[ ] () 1 (,,,) (,)
1
C










while (9c) follows directly from the optimality condition (4b).   
  The equilibrium dynamics can now be represented by the following autonomous system in 
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where, from above,  (,) zl Ω=Ω ,  (,) yy z l = ,  (,) cc z l = , ( ) KK q ψ ψ = , and  ( , ) GG zl ψ ψ = . 
A.2 Steady-State  Equilibrium 
Steady-state equilibrium is attained when  0 znlq = == =    , so that  












G     
.   
0 znlq ====     in (A.6a) – (A.6d) and recalling (A.2a), (A.2b), (A.5a), (A.5b), and the definition of 
(,) zl Ω , we can summarize the steady-state in the following form: 
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       ( A . 7 f )  
These six equations can be solved for the steady-state values of  , , , , , , znlqcy       and consequently, the 
equilibrium growth rate, ψ  .  References 
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